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minds of the vast majority of Americans. To many, talk of racial
profiling conjures up visions of unwarranted and undue atten-
tion paid to minorities by law enforcement officials in the con-
text of traffic stops, crowd control, and a host of other "police
stop" scenarios. However, in the wake of the September 11th
tragedy and the ensuing war on terrorism, racial profiling has
become an issue of importance in an entirely different context -
airline security.
Vigorous debate has taken place over the role of racial profil-
ing in identifying potential terrorists during airlines' pre-flight
passenger screening and boarding process.' Although some
commentators believe that racial profiling is a useful tool for
quickly identifying potential terrorists,2 the widespread use of
racial profiling in the passenger screening and boarding process
would implicate far more persons than just those with malicious
intentions.' The more likely scenario is one in which a large
number of innocent persons are discriminated against in order
to detain a handful of legitimate suspects. Inevitably, some of
those who unjustly suffer under this regime will bring litigation
against the offending airlines to vindicate their rights.
The basic problem posed in this comment is whether these
potential litigants have claims under state civil rights laws in
light of the unsettled state of the preemption doctrine. Rela-
tively little case law has been generated over the years address-
ing the issue of whether federal law preempts racial
discrimination claims brought against airlines under state civil
I See Liam Braber, Korematsu's Ghost: A Post-September 11th Analysis of Race and
National Security, 47 VILL. L. REv. 451 (2002); Samuel R. Gross & Debra Living-
ston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (2002); Peter H.
Schuck, A Case for Profiling, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, Jan. 2002, at 59.
2 Peter Schuck makes a particularly strong argument for using racial profiling
as a screening device in making snap determinations about which passengers to
screen with greater scrutiny. However, he also notes that decisions to arrest and
prosecute must be made "based on more individualized information." Schuck,
supra note 1.
The Department of Justice recently released guidelines allowing the use of
race as a factor in anti-terrorist and national security investigations. SeeJessamyn
Blau, New Rules Ban Most Racial Profiling: Under Federal Policy, Race Can Be Used as
Factor in Cases of National Security, ST. Louis PosT-DISPATCH,June 18, 2003, at Al.
These guidelines allow airport screeners to consider race or ethnicity to prevent
threats to national security and catastrophic events to the extent permitted by the
Constitution and U.S. law. GUIDANCE REGARDING THE USE OF RACE BY FEDERAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION
(June 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/guidance_
onrace.htm. Just how widespread and frequent this power is invoked by airport
screeners remains to be seen.
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rights laws.' Cases that have addressed this issue have reached
erratic results.5 In particular, cases interpreting the preemption
provision contained within the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA)
have failed to produce a predictable, unified rule.6
This comment focuses primarily on how the ADA's preemp-
tion provision currently applies to discrimination claims
brought under state civil rights laws for acts of discrimination
occurring during pre-flight passenger boarding and screening
services conducted by airlines.7 This examination will expose
the lack of a national consensus on this issue, proving the need
for more definitive guidance from the Supreme Court. This
comment argues that state law claims related to airlines' screen-
ing and boarding procedures should be preempted under the
ADA for both legal and policy reasons.
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
At its core, the "preemption doctrine is the judicial tool by
which courts define the contours of federal control of a subject
when Congress has legislated pursuant to one of its enumerated
powers."8 The foundation for federal preemption of state laws is
found in the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution which
4 See Geoffrey A. Hoffman, Racial Profiling in the Air After Sept. 11: Do Those Who
Claim to Have Suffered Its Indignities Have Remedies? It Would Appear So, N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 15, 2002, § 3 (citing the paucity of authority on the issue of federal preemp-
tion of state civil rights laws in the context of racial discrimination as a reason to
bring claims under state civil rights acts).
5 See infra Part III(C) (1), (2).
6 See Daniel H. Rosenthal, Legal Turbulence: The Court's Misconstrual of the Airline
Deregulation Act's Preemption Clause and the Effect on Passengers' Rights, 51 DuKE L.J.
1857, 1876 (2002) (noting that varying interpretations of the ADA preemption
clause have resulted in "societal and legal turbulence"); Calvin Massey, Federalism
and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 508 (2002) (noting that the Court's
recent preemption decisions lack coherence and continuity, creating a "preemp-
tion mess").
7 For the sake of clarity, the scope of this paper is limited to claims arising
from alleged acts of discrimination committed by airlines in (a) pre-flight screen-
ing of passengers and (b) boarding procedures. Pre-flight screening of passen-
gers under the voluntary Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening (CAPS)
program is not dealt with directly, as little is known about the specific criteria
used in CAPS profiling analysis. See Michael AuBuchon, Comment, Choosing How
Safe Is Enough: Increased Antiterrorist Federal Activity and Its Effect on the General Public
and the Airport/Airline Industry, 64J. AIR L. & CoM. 891, 903-04 (1999). Specifi-
cally excluded are acts of discrimination committed by private and federal airport
screeners unassociated with airlines. Such acts are highly unlikely to fall under
the purview of the ADA.
8 MaryJ. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV.
967, 968 (2002).
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provides: "This Constitution and the laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof ... shall be the su-
preme law of the land ... anything in the Constitution or laws of
any State to the contrary notwithstanding. 9 The U.S. Supreme
Court has found that the Supremacy Clause creates a "funda-
mental principle . . . that Congress has the power to preempt
state law."'"
Since 1912, the U.S. Supreme Court has organized its pre-
emption analysis into three categories: (1) express preemption,
(2) field preemption, and (3) conflict preemption." Express
preemption occurs when a federal statute explicitly provides
that it overrides state law. 12 Field preemption occurs when
"Congress . . . so completely preempt[s] a particular area, that
any civil complaint raising that select group of claims is necessa-
rily federal in character."' 3 Finally, conflict preemption occurs
where "it is impossible for a private party to comply with both
state and federal requirements ... or where state law stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."' 4 Taken together, field
preemption and conflict preemption are often considered to be
two subcategories of a broad category entitled "implied
preemption."
The U.S. Supreme Court has long maintained a presumption
against federal preemption of state laws.15 In order to overcome
this presumption, a "clear and manifest purpose" to preempt
must be communicated by Congress.' 6 Express preemption pro-
visions such as the one contained within the ADA constitute a
clear and manifest purpose on the part of Congress to preempt
state law. However, the Court has vacillated in recent years be-
tween construing such express provisions strictly' 7 and reading
" U.S. Const. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
10 Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000).
" Susan D. Hall, Preemption Analysis After Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 90
Ky. LJ. 251, 251-52 (2002).
12 See Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 417 (7th Cir. 2002).
1-3 Id. (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987)).
14 Id. (citing Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995)).
15 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) ("Because the states are
independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Con-
gress does not cavalierly preempt state-law causes of action.").
16 Wellons v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 165 F.3d 493, 494 (6th Cir. 1999).
17 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (finding that
the "touchstone" of preemption analysis must be the intent of Congress) (citing
Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)).
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beyond the language of express provisions to find areas of im-
plied preemption. "
The ADA contains a broadly worded express preemption pro-
vision that has invited constant interpretation by the courts. De-
spite this active interpretation of the ADA's preemption
provision, however, little work has been done to ascertain
whether Congress intended for the ADA to preempt claims
brought against airlines under state civil rights laws, which al-
lege that an airline discriminated against a passenger based on
race during its screening or boarding process. As will be dis-
cussed, the work that has been done does not lead to any over-
arching legal conclusions.
III. EXPRESS PREEMPTION UNDER THE AIRLINE
DEREGULATION ACT
Under current law, it is unclear whether state law based claims
of racial discrimination arising out of pre-flight boarding and
screening procedures conducted by airlines are preempted
under the express language of the ADA. The courts response to
this issue will likely be based upon the following sources of au-
thority: (a) the general guidelines for ADA preemption gener-
ated by the Supreme Court, (b) the development of the
Supreme Court's standard by the circuits, and (c) the small
body of cases dealing with passenger discrimination claims
against airlines. Each of these three sources of authority will be
examined in turn.
Using these three sources, one court has recently found that
the ADA does not preempt state law claims against an airline
arising from an episode of alleged racial profiling and discrimi-
nation on the part of the airline. The reasoning of this case will
be examined at length, and its implications for the future devel-
opment of the law will be explored.
A. THE SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF ADA PREEMPTION
The ADA was enacted in 1978 by Congress as part of an effort
to encourage market competition in the airline industry.1 9 The
ADA dramatically altered the regulation regime established by
18 See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 874 (2000) (rejecting the
"absolutist" notion that the existence of an express preemption provision fore-
closes the possibility of implied preemption).
19 See Susan J. Stabile, Preemption of State Law by Federal Law: A Task for Congress
or the Courts?, 40 VILL. L. REv. 1, 38 (1995).
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the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (FAA), 211 which had given the
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) authority to regulate interstate
airfares, routes, and aircraft safety, and to prosecute certain de-
ceptive trade practices violations.2' In its original form, the FAA
did not contain an express preemption provision, but did con-
tain an express "savings clause," which provided that the FAA
did not abridge any remedies existing at common law or created
via state statute.22 Under the authority granted to it by the FAA,
the CAB essentially displaced the free market in determining
airline fares.
The ADA was enacted by Congress in an effort to replace the
CAB with free-market competition.23 The ADA eliminated
much of the Department of Transportation's 24 authority over
airline fares and routes.25 In addition, Congress attempted to
guarantee that states would not interfere with this deregulation
process by including within the ADA the following strong pre-
emption provision: "[A] State . . .may not enact or enforce a
law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of
law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier...26
This broadly worded preemption provision has resulted in a
significant amount of litigation since its passage in 1978, gener-
ating a large and often contradictory body of case law.2 7 The
U.S. Supreme Court has twice ruled on questions involving ADA
preemption, producing opinions that have created more ques-
tions than they have answered. In its first attempt at delineating
the scope of ADA preemption, the Court held that its express
20 Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
app. §§ 1301-1557 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)), repealed by Pub L. No. 103-272, 108
Stat. 1379 (1994) (current version at 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 40101- 49105 (West 1996)
(amended 2000)).
21 See Stabile, supra note 19, at 38.
22 Id.
23 The ADA was enacted with the purpose of developing "an air transportation
system which relies on competitive market forces to determine the quality, vari-
ety, and price of air services." Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374,
422 (1992) (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-1779, at 53 (1978)).
24 CAB's successor after it was eliminated in 1985.
25 See Stabile, supra note 19, at 38-39.
26 Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 41713(b)(1) (West 2002).
27 Commentators and courts have often criticized the broad language of the
ADA preemption clause as being meaningless, causing delay, and enormous
transaction costs as courts struggle with its proper scope and application on a
case-by-case basis. See Doricent v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 1993 WL 437670, at *7 (D.
Mass. 1993).
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language indicated "a broad preemptive purpose. '"28 Drawing
upon its line of cases dealing with ERISA preemption, the Court
found that the ADA preempted "state enforcement actions hav-
ing a connection with or reference to airline rates, routes, or
services. "29 Expanding upon this standard, the Court found that
a state law can have a forbidden relationship to rates, routes, or
services, even if the law is not specifically designed to affect
rates, routes, or services, or if the effect is merely indirect.30
However, the Court also noted that some effects would be too
"tenuous, remote, and peripheral" to have preemptive effect.3 1
In its second foray into the arena of ADA preemption analysis,
the Court announced that certain breach of contract claims
based on state common law were not preempted by the ADA.32
In reaching this conclusion, the Court found that, when read
together with the savings clause, the ADA preemption provision,
"stops states from imposing their own substantive standards with
respect to rates, routes, or services," but does not preclude relief
to a party who proves that an airline violated a contractual term
that it had stipulated.3 Ultimately, the majority characterized
this decision as charting a middle course between the extremes
of "total preemption" and "minimal preemption" advocated by
various members of the Court.34
B. THE CIRCUIT COURTS' VARYING INTERPRETATIONS
OF "SERVICES"
These broad rules laid down by the Supreme Court have
proved fertile ground for innumerable controversies about the
proper scope and application of the ADA preemption clause.
Among these controversies, none has proven more divisive than
the disagreement about the proper definition of the word "ser-
vices." The split within the circuit courts of appeal regarding
the meaning of this word has become so pronounced that three
28 Morales, 504 U.S. at 383.
29 Id. at 384.
30 Id. at 386.
31 Id. at 390.
32 Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228 (1995) (holding that the
ADA preemption clause did not shelter airlines from suits "seeking recovery
solely for the airline's alleged breach of its own, self-imposed undertakings").
33 Id. at 232.
34 Id. at 234.
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Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court recently announced their
belief that certiorari should be granted to resolve differences.3 5
The two predominant viewpoints on this issue are best laid
out, respectively, in a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case enti-
tled Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 6 and a Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals case entitled Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc.
37
Charas dealt with a passenger's personal injury claim against an
airline brought after she tripped over luggage left in an airplane
aisle by a flight attendant. In finding that her common law
claim was not preempted, the Ninth Circuit held that the term
"services" encompasses "the prices, schedules, origins and desti-
nations of the point-to-point transportation of passengers,
cargo, or mail," but not in-flight services such as provision of
beverages, personal assistance to passengers, luggage handling,
and like amenities." The court predicated this narrow defini-
tion upon its understanding that Congress intended only to pre-
empt state laws and lawsuits that would adversely impact the
economic deregulation of the airline industry and the concur-
rent promotion of market competition.3 9 In conclusion, the
court found that Congress intended the word "services" in the
ADA preemption provision to be used in the "public utility
sense-i.e., the provision of air transportation to and from vari-
ous markets at various times."40 In particular, the court noted
that "services" does not refer to such things as the pushing of
beverage carts, keeping the aisles clear of obstacles, the han-
dling and storage of luggage, and assistance rendered to
passengers.4
In Hodges, the Fifth Circuit found that a passenger's personal
injury claim against Delta Airlines was not preempted under the
ADA because it related to the operation and maintenance of the
aircraft rather than airline services. The Hodges court took a dif-
ferent approach than the Charas court, defining "services" as the
"contractual features of air transportation," including such
things as ticketing, boarding procedures, provision of food and
35 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Duncan, 531 U.S. 1058 (2000) (denial of cert.)
(O'Connor, J., Thomas, J., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
3'6 Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 1998).
37 Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1995).
'1 Charas, 160 F.3d at 1261.
39 Id. at 1265 (stating that "[t]he purpose of preemption is to avoid state inter-
ference with federal deregulation").
40 Id. at 1266.
41 Id. The court found it necessary to limit the word services to this meaning
or else risk "preemption of virtually everything an airline does."
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drink, baggage handling, and all matters "appurtenant and nec-
essarily included with the contract of carriage between the pas-
senger or shipper and the airline. 42 Adding further clarity to its
definition, the court noted that "'baggage handling' and 'board-
ing'.., concern the airline's policy for permitting baggage to be
carried or passengers to be permitted on board."43 The court
distinguished these services from activities relating to the "oper-
ation and maintenance of the aircraft," which it found could
give rise to non-preempted state law claims.44 The court defined
"aircraft operations" as "the use of the aircraft for the purpose
of air navigation . . . includ[ing] the navigation of aircraft. 45
Under this definition, the court found that the negligent stow-
ing of cargo in an overhead bin necessarily relates to the opera-
tion of the aircraft, and is therefore not preempted.46
The Hodges court noted that an example of a claim that
should be preempted is a claim for wrongful eviction by plain-
tiffs who were evicted from a flight because they were loud, bois-
terous, and intoxicated. The court held that a finding of non-
preemption of such a claim "would result in significant de facto
regulation of the airlines' boarding practices and, moreover,
would interfere with federal law granting the airlines substantial
discretion to refuse to carry passengers."47 The court also found
that a claim brought by a passenger arising out of his being
"bumped" from an overbooked flight would be preempted as
being related to the airline's contract for services with its passen-
gers.48 Both of these examples reach results consistent with the
Hodges court's conception of an airline's boarding policy as be-
ing a service offered by an airline unrelated to the operation of
the actual aircraft.
Like Charas and Hodges, the majority of cases interpreting the
meaning of "services" within the ADA preemption provision in-
volve personal injury suits based on state common law causes of
42 Hodges, 44 F.3d at 336 (adopting the definition of "services" set forth in
Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 4 F.3d 350, 354 (5th Cir. 1993)).
43 Id. at 339.
44 Id. (noting that state law torts concerning the "operation and maintenance
of aircraft can be enforced consistently with and distinctly from the services that
Congress deregulated").
45 Id. at 338 (quoting 49 U.S.C.A. § 1301(31) (West 1988)).
46 Id. at 340.
47 Id. at 339 (citing O'Carroll v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 863 F.2d 11 (5th Cir.
1989)).
4. Id. at 339-40 (noting disagreement with the holding in West v. Northwest
Airlines, 995 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1993)).
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action. These cases are important to an analysis of how courts
will address state law based discrimination claims, however, be-
cause they delineate the preemptive scope of the ADA with re-
spect to interactions between airlines and passengers,
particularly in the arena of boarding procedures where a major-
ity of racial profiling claims will arise. For example, if "service"
encompasses boarding practices and security checks, then the
ADA preemption clause very likely covers claims arising from
racial profiling committed by airlines in the pre-flight passenger
boarding and screening process. If "services" is read narrowly,
as the courts following Charas would be apt to do, then boarding
practices may well fall outside the scope of ADA preemption."9
C. PREEMPTION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Claims of racial discrimination are never easy to deal with.
They are inherently subjective, and involve high degrees of emo-
tional involvement for both the plaintiff and defendant. When
discrimination claims involve acts of racial profiling, the diffi-
culty is increased because of the conflicting views concerning
the justification of the acts underlying the claim. Most difficult
of all are those cases involving acts of racial profiling under-
taken for a purportedly exigent social purpose such as public
safety. The current airport security environment is very likely to
produce this type of claim.
The federal courts as well as some state courts have addressed
the issue of how best to apply ADA preemption principles to
claims of racial discrimination in two different but related con-
texts: (1) racial discrimination against airline employees, and
(2) racial discrimination against airline passengers. Although
49 Following its decision in Charas, the Ninth Circuit has continued to employ
a very narrow reading of the term "services" within the ADA preemption clause.
See, e.g., Duncan v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 208 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2000) (hold-
ing that an airline's allowance of smoking on trans-Pacific flights did not consti-
tute or relate to a service); Newman v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 176 F.3d 1128, 1131
(9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the ADA does not preempt state common law
claims based on alleged discrimination against a passenger due to her physical
disabilities); see also Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 128 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir.
1997) (finding that the better, more restrictive analysis of ADA preemption seeks
to determine if a state law "interferes" with the purposes of airline deregulation
under the ADA). The Northern District of California recently followed Charas
and Newman to the conclusion that a passenger's state civil rights claim arising
from an airline's alleged refusal to board him on account of his race was not
preempted by the ADA. Chowdhury v. Northwest Airlines Corp., 238 F. Supp. 2d
1153, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2002). Chowdhury is discussed infra Part III(D).
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the courts are in relative harmony as to the law regarding airline
employees, much less accord exists as to the law regarding air-
line passengers. Cases addressing the preemptive effect of the
ADA on discrimination claims brought by airline employees
have been more numerous in recent years than cases brought by
passengers, and therefore provide an excellent starting place for
examining the courts' general attitude regarding the proper ap-
plication of the ADA preemption clause to state law based dis-
crimination claims.
1. Preemption of State Law Claims Brought by Airline Employees
The circuit courts of appeal generally agree that racial dis-
crimination claims based on state law brought by airline employ-
ees against their employer airlines are not preempted by the
ADA. In reaching this conclusion, the courts have consistently
employed the Supreme Court's reasoning in Morales,50 finding
that state law claims of racial discrimination brought by airline
employees bear too "tenuous, remote, or peripheral" a relation
to airline rates, routes, or services to be preempted.51
This result can appear somewhat counterintuitive, consider-
ing the plain language of the ADA preemption clause. After all,
airline employees provide "services" to airline customers, and
the selection, retention, or dismissal of an employee on racial
grounds-although clearly odious as a matter of principle-
seems logically related to the provision of services. A number of
jurists have followed this very basic logic to the conclusion that
such claims should be preempted.52
Courts avoid this seemingly direct result, however, by inter-
preting the ADA preemption clause in light of the purposes of
the ADA. The ADA was enacted for the twin purposes of pro-
moting "maximum reliance upon competitive market forces,"
and promoting the maintenance of "safety as the highest prior-
50 Morales, 504 U.S. at 390.
51 See Botz v. Omni Air Int'l, 286 F.3d 488, 496 (8th Cir. 2002) (identifying a
distinct line of federal case law holding that discrimination claims founded on
race, age, disability, and gender were not preempted due to being too tenuously
related to rates, routes, and services); Thomas v. United Parcel Serv., 614 N.W.2d
707, 712-13 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that an employee's race bears no rea-
sonable connection or relation to airline rates, routes, or services).
52 See Wellons v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 165 F.3d 493, 503 (6th Cir. 1999)
(Kupansky, J., dissenting) (arguing that finding that employment discrimination
animated by non-performance related characteristics such as race, although un-
justifiable, is still part of the employment relationship between airlines and their
employees, which Congress meant to federalize via the ADA).
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ity in air commerce."53 In the case of Belgard v. United Airlines,54
the Colorado Court of Appeals found that a pilot's disability dis-
crimination claim was preempted by the ADA because the qual-
ity of an airline's employees directly impacts both the safety and
competitive quality of the airline's services offered to consum-
ers. However, this result was quickly repudiated in cases dealing
with discriminatory acts involving the age and race of plaintiff
employees. The primary rationale relied upon by courts in
reaching these conclusions was the assumed fact that an em-
ployee's race and age have little to do with airline safety or com-
petitive efficiency in the marketplace.55 This assumption that
the race of airline employees has nothing to do with airline
safety or marketplace competitiveness allows courts to avoid
case-by-case analysis when dealing with the issue of whether ra-
cial discrimination claims brought by airline employees should
be preempted by the ADA.
However, in cases where physical disability discrimination
claims are at issue, courts must make case-by-case determina-
tions56 as to whether the claim bears any relationship to the ex-
press aims of the ADA. Courts have ranged in their opinions
from holding that the ADA preempts disability discrimination
claims grounded on state civil rights laws whenever the disability
in question implicates the provision of airline services, 57 to hold-
ing that preemption will not operate in disability discrimination
cases where the airline employee's claim fails to raise "signifi-
cant safety concerns.
58
53 Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 40101 (a)(1), (6) (West 1996).
54 Belgard v. United Airlines, 857 P.2d 467, 470-71 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
5 See Wellons v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 165 F.3d 493, 495 (6th Cir. 1999)
(finding that claims of racial discrimination have little to do with air safety or
market efficiency); Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Airlines, 128 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1997)
(noting that claims of age discrimination have little to do with air safety or mar-
ket efficiency).
56 This reality was explicitly acknowledged by the New York appellate court in
Delta Airlines, Inc. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 652 N.Y.S.2d 253, 257-58
(N.Y. App. Div. 1996), when it noted in an age and sex discrimination case that
"preemption must be determined on a case-by-case basis..."
-5 See Belgard v. United Airlines, 857 P.2d 467 (Colo. App. 1993) (holding that
any law that restricts an airline's selection of employees based on physical charac-
teristics automatically relates to services being rendered by the airline, triggering
the ADA preemption clause); Fitzpatrick v. Simmons Airlines, Inc., 555 N.W.2d
479, 481 (Mich. App. 1996) (employing Belgard's logic to find that an airline em-
ployee's discrimination claim brought after he was terminated for violating air-
line's height and weight standards was preempted by the ADA).
58 See, e.g., Aloha Islandair, Inc. v. Tseu, 128 F.3d 1301, 1303 (9th Cir. 1997).
Significantly, the Ninth Circuit in Aloha Islandair explicitly recognized the logical
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A good summary of the law regarding employment discrimi-
nation claims brought by airline employees grounded in state
law is as follows: (1) claims of racial discrimination will not be
preempted due to their tenuous relationship to airline rates,
routes, and services; and (2) claims of disability discrimination
may or may not be preempted based on whether the disability
bears a close relationship to airline safety and raises significant
safety concerns.59
2. Preemption of State Law Claims Brought by Airline Passengers
Although cases addressing the proper application of the ADA
preemption provision to racial discrimination claims brought by
airline employees have been plentiful, cased addressing the appli-
cation of the ADA preemption provision to racial discrimination
claims brought by passengers have been relatively rare. Those
that have been decided do not form a readily coherent body of
case law. The reason for this lack of coherence lies primarily in
the divergence of opinion among the courts as to the proper
interpretation of the word "services" in the ADA preemption
provision, and its relation to the ADA's goal of promoting air-
line safety.
The ADA was enacted with the twin purposes of promoting
market efficiency and airline safety.6 ° In addition to this general
declaration of purpose, the ADA provides airlines with the
power to exclude passengers believed to pose a safety issue, so
long as the decision to exclude the passenger is not irrational or
unreasonable under the facts and circumstances known to the
airline at the time. 61 In cases involving claims brought by pas-
connection between airline safety and services, finding that courts were exper-
iencing a "severe division of authority over whether the reference to 'services' in
section 1305(a) (1) preempts state or local regulation or adjudication of aircraft
safety." Id. at 1302 (quoting Anderson v. Evergreen Int'l Airlines, Inc., 886 P.2d
1068, 1071 (Or. Ct. App. 1994)).
59 The Ninth Circuit has explicitly recognized that claims of sex and age dis-
crimination brought by airline employees are, in all probability, equally as secure
from ADA preemption as similar racial discrimination claims because of their
failure to implicate safety or market efficiency concerns. Id.
60 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 40101 (a)(1), (6) (West 1996).
61 49 U.S.C.A. § 44902(b) (West 1996). See also Cordero v. Cia Mexicana De
Aviacion, S.A., 681 F.2d 669, 672 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Williams v. Trans World
Airlines, 509 F.2d 942, 948 (2d Cir. 1975)). Although § 44902(b) insulates air-
lines from liability when their actions are reasonable in light of the facts and
circumstances known to them at the time, it does not preclude claims made
against airlines when their decision to exclude a passenger from flight is irration-
ally and unreasonably formed. Cordero, 681 F.2d at 671.
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sengers alleging acts of racial discrimination on the part of an
airline, the court's decision on whether to preempt the claim is
often predicated upon the nexus between the alleged discrimi-
natory act and both airline safety and airline services. These
cases support the contention that claims arising from acts occur-
ring during the provision of airline services in furtherance of
airline safety are more likely to be preempted than discrimina-
tory acts having no connection to either services or safety.
A good example of a case involving acts of discrimination un-
related to boarding services or airline safety is Abou-Jaoude v. Brit-
ish Airways.62 In Abou-Jaoude, a Lebanese family brought several
claims against British Airways, including a claim under Califor-
nia's Unruh Civil Rights Act for discrimination on account of
race, 63 alleging that they had endured rude and outrageous
treatment from an airline employee at the Los Angeles Interna-
tional airport while assisting a family member during check-in
and boarding procedures. The California Appellate Court
found that the family's claims under the Unruh Civil Rights Act
were not preempted by the ADA. The court interpreted the
ADA preemption provision as applying only to laws that directly
attempt to regulate air carriers. 64 Finding that the Unruh Civil
Rights Act was a law of general application, the court ruled that
claims brought under its auspices were not expressly preempted
by the ADA.65 Significantly, British Airways at no time at-
tempted to argue that its actions were justified by any safety con-
cerns whatsoever, but rather relied upon the plain language of
the ADA preemption clause-an argument the court side-
stepped by reading the ADA preemption clause narrowly to ap-
ply only to state laws specifically focused on aviation.
In Doricent v. American Airlines, Inc.,"6 however, the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Massachusetts addressed the lan-
guage of the ADA preemption clause directly, finding that it did
not operate to preempt a passenger's racial discrimination claim
brought under a Massachusetts civil rights law.67 In Doricent, an
62 Abou-Jaoude v. British Airways, 281 Cal. Rptr. 150 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
63 CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 51-52 (West 2002).
64 Abou-Jaoude, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 153. This interpretation is almost certainly
erroneous, as laws of general applicability may have a forbidden connection with
airline rates, routes, or services. See Morales, 504 U.S. at 386 (finding that a law
may have a forbidden connection with rates, routes, or services, even if the law
was not specifically designed to affect airline rates, routes, or services).
65 Abou-Jaoude, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
66 Doricent v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 1993 WL 437670 (D. Mass. 1993).
67 Id. at *7.
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African-American man alleged that he was subjected to physical
and verbal abuse by American Airlines employees on account of
his race while boarding a flight from Haiti to New York.6" Al-
though the facts were hotly contested, American never argued
that its actions were taken specifically for safety reasons. Rather,
it argued that the alleged incident took place during the provi-
sion of boarding services and was therefore covered by the ADA
preemption clause. 9
In reaching its conclusion that Doricent's claim under the
Massachusetts civil rights law was not preempted, the district
court discerned in Morales a "significant impact" test which
would allow for preemption under the ADA of state laws that
have a significant effect or impact on airline rates, routes, or
services.7v Using this test, the district court disposed of Ameri-
can's argument that Doricent's claim arose from activities "relat-
ing to" airline services, stating, "[r]acial discrimination, the
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and assault and bat-
tery have nothing whatsoever to do with any legitimate or quasi-
legitimate industry-wide practice of affording airline service. '"71
Essentially, the district court rejected American's claims for rea-
sons unrelated to the issue of whether the alleged discrimina-
tory acts took place during the provision of an airline service-
in this case, boarding procedures. Rather, the court found that
the actions giving rise to the claim were so outrageous that they
should not be considered a legitimate component of normal
boarding procedures. Such reasoning implicitly rejects a formal
approach to the definition of "services" for the purposes of in-
terpreting the ADA preemption clause in favor of a more delib-
erative analysis of what should constitute airline services.
A completely different approach was taken in a similar case by
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in
Huggar v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.7 2 In Huggar, a 21 year old black
male was removed from a Northwest flight after throwing an-
other passenger's luggage, threatening to physically assault the
passenger, and claiming that he could "buy" the passenger.7"
Huggar brought federal discrimination claims and state tort
68 Id. at *1.
6" Id. at *6.
70 Id. at *4-5 (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 390
(1992)).
71 Id. at *5.
72 Huggar v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 1999 WAL 59841 (N.D. Il1. 1999).
73 Id. at *1.
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claims against Northwest, arguing that his ejection from the
flight was racially motivated."4 Citing the Seventh Circuit's test
enunciated in Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia,75 the court held that for a law to be preempted by the
ADA, it must (a) be a law enforced or enacted by a state, and (b)
relate to airline rates, routes, or services by either "expressly re-
ferring to them or by having a significant economic effect upon
them."76 The court then noted that the Seventh Circuit had
adopted the Fifth Circuit's definition of services as a "bargained-
for or anticipated provision of labor from one party to an-
other."77 The court concluded its analysis by finding that Hug-
gar's state law tort claims "related to" Northwest's service of
providing airline transportation and were therefore preempted
by the ADA.78
The Huggar case diverges sharply from Doricent in its refusal to
look beyond the type of services offered in order to consider the
manner in which they were offered. To this effect, the court in
Huggarwrote, "the critical inquiry is... the underlying nature of
the actions taken, not the manner in which they were accom-
plished. Therefore, a court should not look to the subjective
motivations of the employees because they are irrelevant to de-
termining what constitutes 'services' within the meaning of the
[ADA].-
The result in Huggar is consistent with the Fifth Circuit's defi-
nition of "services" posited in Hodges, considered in light of the
strong federal interest in aviation safety expressed in the FAA.
Huggar's actions were clearly an impediment to the safety of the
other passengers, and the airline's decision to eject him from
the flight had a clear connection with the "service" of boarding
and seating passengers. As the following discussion will indi-
cate, however, even when an airline has a passable safety ratio-
nale for excluding a passenger from a given flight, preemption
will not occur unless the court hearing the case adopts an inter-
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at *8 (citing Travel All Over the World, Inc., 73 F.3d at 1432).
77 Huggar, 1999 WL 59841, at *9 (quoting Travel All Over the World, Inc., 73 F.3d
at 1433 (quoting Hodges, 44 F.3d at 336)).
78 Id. The court drew support for its position from Pearson v. Lake Forest Country
Day Sch., 633 N.E.2d 1315, 1320-21 (Ill. 1994), in which the Illinois Supreme
Court found that tort claims based on an airline's refusal to transport the plaintiff
passenger were directly connected to airline services.
79 Id. (citations omitted).
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pretation of "services" that is broad enough to encompass air-
line screening and boarding procedures.
D. CHOWDHURY v. NORTHWEST AIRLINES
Roughly one month after the events of September 11, 2001,
Arshad Chowdhury, a U.S. citizen of Bangladeshi ancestry, was
denied passage aboard a Northwest Airlines flight departing
from San Francisco International Airport. Chowdhury endured
a number of embarrassing detentions, searches, and delays at
the behest of Northwest Airlines employees after he had already
been cleared to fly by the FBI and airport security. He was even-
tually denied access to his flight after being told by a Northwest
supervisor that his treatment stemmed from a "security issue."
The "security issue" apparently arose from phonetic similarities
between Chowdhury's name and a name on the FBI's list of sus-
pected terrorists."
Chowdhury brought a number of federal and state claims
against Northwest Airlines as a result of his detention and exclu-
sion from his flight, including claims under section 51 of Cali-
fornia's Unruh Civil Rights Act."1 Northwest Airlines argued
that Chowdhury's state claims were preempted by the ADA. 2
Finding the act of refusing to allow a particular passenger to
board an aircraft to be unrelated to "services" within the mean-
ing of the ADA, the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of California ruled that Chowdhury's claim under
the Unruh Act was not preempted."'
In reaching its decision, the court relied heavily upon the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of "services" in Charas and New-
man. 4 The court cited Charas for the proposition that, within
the context of the ADA, Congress intended to use the word "ser-
vices" in the public utility sense, referring specifically to the
"provision of air transportation to and from various markets at
various times. '8 5 The court then noted that Newman had ap-
80 Chowdhury Complaint, available at www.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aclu/
chwdhrynwa60402cmp.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2003).
81 Id.
82 Chowdhury v. Northwest Airlines, Corp., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1155 (N.D.
Cal. 2002).
83 Id. at 1155-56.
84 Id. at 1155. ("Defendants contend that the decision whether to board a pas-
senger falls within the definition of 'service.' Binding Ninth Circuit law fore-
closes defendants' argument.").
85 Id. (citing Charas v. Trans World Airlines, 160 F.3d 1259, 1266 (9th Cir.
1998)).
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plied Charas's definition of "services" in refusing to preempt a
claim brought by an airline passenger who had been refused.
permission to board a flight on account of her heart condi-
tion. 6  The court then applied Charas and Newman to
Chowdhury's claim:
If refusing to allow a passenger to board because of her disability
is not a "service" within the meaning of the ADA, then refusing
to allow a passenger to board because of his race is also not a
"service." In both cases the challenged conduct-refusing to al-
low a particular passenger to board-has nothing to do with the
provision of transportation to and from various markets. Accord-
ingly, under binding Ninth Circuit law, plaintiffs state law claims
are not preempted by the express preemption provision of the
ADA.87
At no point in its preemption analysis did the court even con-
sider the relevance of any safety concerns that Northwest may
have had regarding Chowdhury.
Chowdhury emphasizes the dispositive role that the court's in-
terpretation of the word "services" plays in guiding preemption
analysis-particularly in cases involving claims made by passen-
gers arising from an airline's refusal to board them for reasons
associated with the passengers' race or ethnicity. If, as the Ninth
Circuit believes, boarding procedures are outside the scope of
airline "services" for purposes of the ADA, then such refusals will
never generate preemptable claims. If, however, a court adopts
a definition of "services" more in line with the Fifth Circuit's
interpretation, then claims based upon such refusals may well be
preempted under the ADA. For reasons of both law and public
policy, this second outcome is the most favorable.
IV. BALANCING SAFETY AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE AIR
The very nature of the threat facing America post 9-11 de-
mands that trade-offs be made in order to enhance airline secur-
ity. Unfortunately, a certain amount of civil rights may be
sacrificed to strengthen security in the air. The Justice Depart-
ment conceded as much earlier this year with its release of con-
troversial new security guidelines allowing the use of race as a
factor in anti-terrorist and national security investigations. 8 Al-
though private airlines are not a part of the federal government,
86 Id. (citing Newman v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 176 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 1999)).
87 Id. at 1155-56.
88 See supra note 3.
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their role in preserving security in the air is no less important
than the role played by airport screeners and the FBI.
While airlines should not be allowed to wantonly discriminate
against passengers based on race or any other identifying char-
acteristic, they should be given consistent legal guidance as to
what is actionable conduct and what is not actionable conduct
within the context of security precautions taken during passen-
ger boarding procedures. Without consistent guidance, airlines
will likely take more or less aggressive security measures based
upon the particular law of the jurisdiction in which they are op-
erating. All parties involved-whether airline employees, non-
suspect passengers, or innocent passengers who may well bear
the misfortune of being singled out based on some defining
characteristic-deserve better. For both legal and policy rea-
sons, preemption of state claims arising from security precau-
tions taken during boarding procedures is the means by which
predictability in this area might be achieved.
A. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
Airlines have been plagued with uncertainty surrounding the
meaning of "services" within the ADA preemption provision
since the time of its inception. The effects of this uncertainty
may be exacerbated by the demands that are currently being
placed upon airlines to guarantee the security of their passen-
gers in light of the ever-present threat of terrorist activity. Given
the fact that airlines will increasingly be called upon to make
snap decisions during the boarding process regarding poten-
tially suspicious passengers, based upon a broad matrix of char-
acteristics including, but not limited to, ethnicity and race, the
application of the ADA to boarding procedures must be
clarified.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals provided a roadmap for
achieving this clarification in Smith v. Comair, Inc.89 In Comair,
the Fourth Circuit grappled with the question of whetherJames
Smith's breach of contract and intentional tort claims were pre-
empted by the ADA when he had been excluded from the sec-
ond leg of his flight due to the airline's own failure to comply
with FAA security regulations requiring all passengers to show
photo identification upon initial boarding.90
89 Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 1998).
90 Id. at 256.
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The Fourth Circuit held that Smith's claims were preempted
because they had a forbidden relation to the "service" of airline
boarding practices.9 In reaching this conclusion, the court
made some important observations. For example, the court
noted that when Congress deregulated the airline industry in
1978, it retained, essentially intact, what is now 49 U.S.C. section
44902(b), granting airlines broad discretion to exclude passen-
gers whose presence is reasonably believed to be inimical to air-
line safety.9 2 The court found this power appropriate given the
"formidable safety and security concerns ' posed by air travel in
modern society. Turning to Smith's claim, the court found that
allowing him to challenge the airline's boarding procedures
under a general breach of contract claim for failure to transport
would "allow the fifty states to regulate an area of unique federal
concern-airlines' boarding practices. ' 94 The court then pro-
claimed, "[A]irlines must be accorded broad discretion in mak-
ing boarding decisions related to safety. Allowing Smith's claim to
proceed would frustrate this important federal objective. 95 The
court declared that, based on this reasoning, Smith's contract
claim was preempted under the ADA.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Comair is significant for sev-
eral reasons. First, it assumes without argument that airline-
boarding practices come within the scope of the ADA preemp-
tion provision as an airline service. This interpretation of "ser-
vices" directly conflicts with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of
"services" in Charas and is in harmony with the Fifth Circuit's
interpretation of "services" in Hodges.9 6 In addition to utilizing
the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of "services," the Fourth Circuit
further refined the connection between "services" and boarding
procedures. The Fourth Circuit found that claims "premised
on" an airline's refusal to permit a passenger to board are pre-
empted.9" The court also noted, however, that claims based on
9' More specifically, in ruling that ADA preemption was proper, the court
looked to the fact that Comair had invoked federal defenses to Smith's contract
claim, and therefore, the claim could only be adjudicated by reference to federal
law external to the parties' bargain. Id. at 258-59.
92 Id. at 257-58.
,; Id. at 258.
94 Id. at 258-59.
q5 Id. at 259 (emphasis added).
96 The Fourth Circuit cites Hodges as persuasive authority for the proposition
that boarding practices fall within the ambit of "services" as the word is used
within the ADA. Id. at 258-59.
97 Id. at 259.
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conduct distinct from an airline's determination not to grant
permission to board are not preempted because they bear too
tenuous and remote a relationship to boarding practices98
The Fourth Circuit's Comair decision also explicitly recog-
nized that the federal government's strong concern in airline
safety constitutes a decisive reason to include boarding practices
within the ambit of airline "services" for purposes of the ADA.
The court found that section 44902(b) "recognizes airlines'
boarding practices as a specific area of federal concern."99
Reading section 44902(b) together with the ADA's preemption
provision, the court proclaimed, "Federal law-in conjunction
with its broad preemption of state-law claims related to airlines'
services-appropriately grants airlines latitude in making deci-
sions necessary to safeguard passengers from potential security
threats."'00
Although the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of "services" in
Comair extended the scope of the ADA preemption provision to
include claims arising from airline boarding procedures in cer-
tain cases,' 0 ' the court refused to adopt a per se rule that pre-
emption applies to all claims related to boarding procedures.
The court recognized that claims stemming from "outrageous
conduct" on the part of an airline toward a passenger would not
be preempted if they bore too tenuous a relationship to airline
services. The court noted that an example would be where "an
airline held a passenger without a safety or security justifica-
tion."102 Therefore, claims arising from acts of wanton racial dis-
98 Id.
99 Id. at 258.
100 Id.
101 The court took care to note that a determination of whether a claim has a
connection with or reference to an airline's prices, routes, or services, is depen-
dent upon the "facts underlying the specific claim." Id. at 259.
102 Id. The court cited Chrissafis v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D.
Ill. 1996) as an example of a case in which a claim was found not to be pre-
empted by the ADA due to its tenuous relationship with airline services. In Chris-
safis, the court distinguished false imprisonment claims based on an airline's
refusal to transport, and false imprisonment claims based on an airline's provid-
ing inaccurate information to law enforcement officials, causing arrest. The
court found that the former claim should be preempted while the latter claim
should not. Chrissafis, 940 F. Supp. at 1298-99. The court noted that where "the
crux of the claim was the airline's refusal to transport," the claim related to ser-
vices and was therefore preempted. Id. at 1298. Claims arising from actions that
fail to "reasonably further the provision of an airline service," however, bear too
tenuous a relation to airline services to be preempted. Id. at 1299.
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crimination, bearing no real connection to the provision of the
airline service of boarding, would not be preempted.
Under the reasoning of Comair, claims brought against air-
lines under state civil rights laws would be preempted by the
ADA if they were premised upon or arose out of an airline's
determination not to allow the plaintiff to board an aircraft for
reasons related to safety. However, claims premised upon acts
of wanton discrimination, unrelated to boarding procedures or
having no relation to safety concerns, would most likely not be
preempted under Comair. This distinction would allow for the
use of race or ethnicity by airlines as a factor in conducting in-
vestigations for the purpose of preventing "threats to national
security and catastrophic events," placing preemption law in line
with the Department of Justice's new guidelines." 3
Some courts may be unwilling to find that race or ethnicity
constitute factors that may acceptably be used by airlines when
making decisions about which passengers to deny access to
flights for reasons of air safety. The Doricent court laid the
groundwork for such a finding when it declared that racial dis-
crimination has nothing to do with legitimate airline services. °4
Under this reasoning, state law claims against airlines grounded
upon alleged acts of racial discrimination occurring during the
boarding process could be adjudged too tenuously and remotely
related to services to be preempted under the ADA. Such rea-
soning is meritorious for its refusal to condone the use of race
or ethnicity as a factor in taking actions that may well cast asper-
sions on the character and motivations of perfectly innocent
persons. However, recent events may conspire against its adop-
tion and in favor of an interpretation of "services" more in line
with Comair.
B. WHAT'S IN THE NEWS: How CURRENT EVENTS AFFECT
THE ANALYSIS
Many commentators have argued that the horrific events of
September 11, 2001 "changed everything."''0 5 Although slightly
overstated, this claim has merit with respect to both the federal
government's approach to regulating airline safety and the aca-
1031 See supra note 3.
104 Doricent, 1993 WL 437670, at *5; see supra Part 111(C) (2) (providing an in-
depth discussion on Doricent).
105 E.g., David A. Harris, Racial Profiling Revisited: 'Just Common Sense" in the Fight
Against Terror?, 17 CRIM. JUST. 36 (Summer 2002).
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demic and public debate over the meaning and appropriateness
of racial profiling. If prior periods of national emergency have
demonstrated anything, they have shown that courts often will
take such extrinsic circumstances into account-for better or
worse-when dealing with legal issues touching on both race
and national security in times of novel and extreme danger to
the American people.' °6
In the months immediately following the September 11 ter-
rorist attacks, Congress passed and the President signed a bill
entitled the "Aviation and Transportation Security Act."'0 7
Among the Act's key provisions were those calling for the hard-
ening of the flight deck cabin door against intruders,'0 8 deploy-
ment of air marshals aboard certain flights,'0 9 and broad federal
regulatory authority over airport security screening opera-
tions.l"0 During debate on the bill, the Senate passed a version
calling for the complete federalization of the airport security
screening process. This proposal was later modified under pres-
sure from Republican congressional leadership to allow gradual
reversion to the use of private screening companies, albeit
under pervasive federal regulatory supervision."'
The net effect of this pervasive regulation of the aviation in-
dustry by the federal government, and the resulting loss of pri-
vacy to the average airport traveler, has led one commentator to
declare that "airports are Fascist."' 1 2 A less debatable and more
useful conclusion to draw from the above facts is that the avia-
tion industry has increasingly become a matter of great federal
concern. In particular, aviation safety is clearly a field that Con-
gress is determined to occupy as fully and completely as possi-
ble. This reality has significant consequences for ADA
preemption analysis in cases where acts taken in furtherance of
airline safety collide with a passenger's right to be free from un-
warranted racial discrimination. In cases where an airline
utilizes race or ethnicity as a factor in making a determination to
106 See Braber, supra note 1, at 453 (noting "wartime and national security inter-
ests. . .have often overridden constitutional protection, even though the equal
protection doctrine imposes strong prejudice against racial discrimination).
107 Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of
49 U.S.C.A.).
108 Id. § 104(a) (1) (B), 115 Stat. at 605-06 (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 44903).
109 Id. § 105, 115 Stat. at 606-07 (codified at 49 U.S.C.A § 44917).
110 Id. § 101(a), 115 Stat. at 597-98 (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 114(e)).
I"l See Gil Grantmore, The Phages of American Law, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 455,
480-81 (2003).
112 Id. at 477.
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exclude a passenger from a flight out of concern for its safety,
courts will have ample reason in light of the increasing federal
concern with aircraft safety to preempt victim passengers' state
law claims as "related to" services, while allowing their federal
discrimination claims to proceed.
By applying the ADA preemption clause in this way, courts
would accomplish two important goals: (1) require passengers
whose rights have been violated to obtain relief via federal anti-
discrimination statutes such as 42 U.S.C. § 1981,113 Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,114 and, potentially, newly enacted
42 U.S.C. § 40127;'15 and (2) promote uniformity and predict-
ability in the development of case law dealing with security-re-
lated incidents of racial profiling. Passengers would not be left
without remedy for invasions of their civil rights, and airlines
would be free to aggressively protect passenger safety within the
confines of a well-defined body of rules developed over time as
courts interpret and apply the ADA preemption provision to
claims arising under a limited number of federal statutes." 6
A second recent development in American society that may
influence courts in their interpretation and application of the
ADA preemption clause to acts of racial profiling is the renewed
debate over the meaning and acceptability of racial profiling as
a means to combat terrorism. Prior to the events of September
1 th, racial profiling was universally regarded as anathema to all
things right and good in American law and culture. However,
following September llth, public opinion has shifted to the
point where a majority of Americans agree with subjecting peo-
ple of Middle Eastern decent to more intensive law enforcement
scrutiny.1 17 Basing legal decision-making on this shift in public
opinion alone in order to promote national security would be
113 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West 1994) (prohibiting discrimination in the making
and enforcing of contracts).
114 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(d) (West 1994) (prohibiting discrimination by recipi-
ents of federal funding on account of race or national origin).
115 42 U.S.C.A. § 40127 (West 2002). Although the courts have yet to interpret
this statute in a comprehensive way, at least one commentator has suggested that
courts should look to analogous case law interpreting § 40127's predecessor stat-
ute, 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b), as providing litigants with a private cause of action. See
Hoffman, supra note 4.
116 The Fourth Circuit recognized this point in Comair, writing that, if courts
allowed defacto state regulation of airline boarding practices by refusing to pre-
empt state law claims relating to safety practices, "[a]irlines might hesitate to re-
fuse passage in cases of potential danger for fear of state law.., actions claiming
refusal to transport." Comair, 134 F.3d at 259.
117 Gross & Livingston, supra note 1, at 1413-14.
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completely inexcusable both morally and as a matter of constitu-
tional law. ' 8
The change, however, has not been limited to public opinion.
Legal scholars have, for the first time in years, begun question-
ing the basic nature of racial profiling itself. In a helpful article
published on National Review Online, Roger Clegg suggests that
the term "racial profiling" refers to three different law-enforce-
ment activities:
First, it can refer to making a guess about the characteristics of
the person who has committed a particular, notorious crime. Sec-
ond, it can also refer to making a guess about the characteristics
of people who are likely to commit nonspecific offenses. And,
third, it can refer to the identified characteristics of a person or
persons who committed a particular crime. 1 9
Writing in the Columbia Law Review, Samuel Gross and Debra
Livingston argue that the third type of profiling described above
is not profiling at all, but rather legitimate information upon
which to base efficient police activity. 20 According to Gross and
Livingston, racial profiling occurs only when police activity di-
rected at an individual is predicated upon the belief that that
person's "racial or ethnic group [is] more likely than the popu-
lation at large to commit the sort of crime the officer is investi-
gating."'12' This definition of racial profiling is consistent with
the first two types of activities described by Clegg.
Defining racial profiling as merely "making a guess" about the
race or ethnicity of persons who are likely to commit non-spe-
cific offenses creates serious difficulties in classifying much of
the race-specific law enforcement activity that has taken place
since September 11 th. In the context of airline security, paying
heightened attention to, and possibly even removing from
flights, persons of Middle Eastern descent based in part on their
race or ethnicity appears to be nothing more than making a
guess about the racial characteristics of persons who may com-
mit a non-specific future offense-classic racial profiling under
the Gross-Livingston analysis.
118 See Huong Vu, Us Against Them: The Path to National Security is Paved by Ra-
cism, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 661, 691-93 (2002) (arguing that American history is rife
with incidents where the Government used national security concerns to scape-
goat and discriminate against ethnic and racial minorities).
I Roger Clegg, Profiling vs. Profiling vs. Profiling: Let's Retire the Verb, NAT'L REV.
ONLINE (Nov. 15, 2002), at http://nationalreview.com/clegg/clegg 1I1502.asp.
120 Gross & Livingston, supra note 1, at 1415.
121 Id.
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However, as Roger Clegg points out, these same activities
could be interpreted as being measures taken against a specific
terror network that has committed specific crimes in the past,
and has a highly specific religious and political agenda with
strong Middle Eastern roots-activities fitting into his third "spe-
cific crime" category. 122 The difficulty in accurately characteriz-
ing actions of the sort described above is compounded by the
fact that (a) even if 90% of all terrorists meet the profile of be-
ing a Muslim, Middle-Eastern male, well over 99.9% of all such
persons that may be subjected to higher scrutiny are perfectly
innocent; 12 3 and (b) terrorism is the definitive "a-symmetrical
threat," because one terrorist acting alone can cause tremen-
dous destruction and death.
24
The asymmetrical nature of the threat posed by terrorism was
likely one of the factors that drove the promulgation of the De-
partment of Justice's GUIDANCE REGARDING THE USE OF RACE BY
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES.' 25  The GUIDANCE
roundly condemns the use of racial profiling in the vast majority
of law enforcement activities, stating: "Racial profiling in law en-
forcement is not merely wrong, but also ineffective. Race-based
assumptions in law enforcement perpetuate negative racial ste-
reotypes that are harmful to our rich and diverse democracy,
and materially impair our efforts to maintain a fair and just soci-
ety."1 2' 6 However, the GUIDANCE does provide for the use of race
or ethnicity by federal officers when "investigating or preventing
threats to national security.' 27 With respect to such threats, the
GuIDANCE states:
The Constitution prohibits consideration of race or ethnicity in
law enforcement decisions in all but the most exceptional in-
stances. Given the incalculably high stakes involved in such inves-
tigations, however, Federal law enforcement officers who are
protecting national security or preventing catastrophic events (as
well as airport security screeners) may consider race, ethnicity, and
other relevant factors to the extent permitted by our laws and the
122 See Clegg, supra note 119.
123 See Gross & Livingston, supra note 1, at 1423.
124 The assymetrical nature of the problem of terrorism in the skies is summed
up well by Peter Schuck: "If [a screener] stops everyone . . . all of the people
(except one, perhaps) will turn out to be perfectly innocent. On the other hand,
if she fails to stop the one person among them who is in fact a terrorist, she
causes a social calamity of incalculable proportions." Schuck, supra note 1.
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Constitution. Similarly, because enforcement of the laws protect-
ing the Nation's borders may necessarily involve a consideration
of a person's alienage in certain circumstances, the use of race or
ethnicity in such circumstances is properly governed by existing
statutory and constitutional standards.' 28
This language appears to represent a position on the part of
the Justice Department that, within the current security environ-
ment, racial profiling in limited circumstances may serve the
compelling state interest of promoting national-and airline-
security. Undoubtedly, the GUIDANCE will only serve to further
complicate the issue of whether airlines as well as airport screen-
ers may take race into account when making boarding decisions.
The net result of the difficulty in properly assessing the nature
of racial profiling in the current security environment upon the
courts' application of the ADA preemption clause to cases in-
volving the use of race in airline security checks is unclear.
Faced with the urgent need for airlines to "get it right" with re-
spect to ferreting out potential terrorists coupled with the fed-
eral government's increased role in regulating airline security,
courts may follow the Huggar court in being less willing to "look
behind" the service of airline boarding procedures in order to
consider their motivating purpose, opting instead for a more lit-
eral reading of the ADA preemption clause. 29 Otherwise,
courts will be faced with the impossible task of determining, in
light of current events, just what actions are so "tenuously and
remotely" related to airline services and safety concerns as to
avoid preemption under the ADA.
V. THE ROAD AHEAD: CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This comment has attempted to analyze a narrow issue within
a very broad legal and social context. The question of whether
state law claims brought by passengers alleging racial discrimina-
tion by airlines will be preempted under the ADA when the dis-
criminatory acts take place during pre-flight passenger
screening and boarding procedures is located at the interstices
of numerous legal and social battlegrounds. From a legal per-
spective, the answer to this question will be shaped by how the
courts reconcile a proper abhorrence for racial discrimination
with the federal government's pervasive regulation of airline
128 Id. (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975))
(emphasis added).
129 See supra note 80.
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safety and the specific-but by no means clear-language of the
ADA. From a social perspective, courts must take into consider-
ation evolving definitions of and attitudes toward racial profiling
when determining whether the actions of airlines relate in any
meaningful way to the provision of services.
The difficult issues surrounding the proper role that race and
ethnicity should play in the current security environment will
remain for courts to grapple with in the coming years. Al-
though racial profiling has duly earned its ugly reputation in
American society, the use of race as one factor in making threat
assessments about airline passengers does not fit neatly into any
of the classic scenarios. As September 11, 2001 clearly demon-
strated, airlines are front line players in the effort to deal with a
very real and dangerous threat. Courts should seek ways to al-
low airlines to aggressively confront this threat while simultane-
ously protecting the most basic rights of all Americans.
Preempting state law claims of racial discrimination arising
from an airline's good faith efforts to protect passenger safety is
one way that courts could do so. By preempting claims arising
from legitimate, good-faith efforts by airlines to weed out poten-
tial terrorists, courts can (1) provide airlines with greater clarity
about what uses of race are and are not acceptable in pre-flight
screening and boarding procedures by limiting litigation to
claims founded on a discreet set of federal statutes, allowing
them to pursue safety measures more aggressively, and (2) safe-
guard the rights of passengers who are victimized by improper
uses of racial profiling using federal remedies. Clearly, courts
must grapple with what a legitimate use of racial profiling might
be in the airline safety context -if there truly is such a thing.
Preemption offers courts a tool with which to shape the solution
in a uniform and consistent way that protects the safety of air-
line passengers while jealously guarding the rights of all Ameri-
cans to be free from invidious racial discrimination.
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